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I. INTRODUCTION
The European Union (EU) represents the world's largest trading bloc, with a
population of over 372 million people and a combined Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) greater than that of the United States. Moreover, the EU continues to grow,
spreading eastward, with possible membership for Estonia, Poland, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Cyprus as early as 2002.2 It is the sheer size of
this growing economic superpower that underscores the importance to the inter-
national law practitioner of understanding both the legal foundations and long-term,
macroeconomic implications of European Monetary Union (EMU).
This Comment intends to provide that understanding. To provide a foundation
upon which EMU may be analyzed, Section II of this Comment discusses the
structure of the EU by examining the roles of its four institutional pillars-the
European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, and the European Court of
Justice. Section I examines the history of EMU-by discussing previous attempts
at monetary union by the EU. Section IV explains how the Single European Act
provided the legal ability of EU members to further pursue EMU. Section V details
the EU's attempt to establish EMU through the Treaty of Maastricht, including the
economic obligations that the Maastricht Treaty3 and the recently enacted Stability
and Growth Pact' place on EU members. Section VI provides information and
analysis of how EMU will affect EU Members' ability to control inflation, manage
business cycles and borrow money. Finally, Section VII concludes by offering a
brief summary of the questions and issues surrounding EMU.
I. THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The roots of the EU date back to 1957, when Belgium, France, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands and West Germany signed the Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community (EEC Treaty).' The EEC Treaty went into effect
I. See Europe's Mid-Life Crisis, A Survey of the European Union, THE ECONOMIST, May 31, 1997, at 2
[hereinafter Europe's Mid-Life Crisis] (summarizing the accomplishments of the EU's first four decades). Within
its first four decades of existence the EU has grown from six to fifteen members, with a population of 372 million.
Id. Currently, as the world's largest trading block, its GDP is well ahead of that of the U.S. Id.
2. See Wolfgang Strasbourg, A Budget for Reform. THE ECONOMIST, July 19, 1997, at 44 [hereinafter
Strasbourg, A Budget for Reform] (explaining that the commission's Agenda 2000 package proposes to maintain
a spending ceiling of 1.27% of GDP even if six new members arrive in 2002). Successful new applicants are listed
as Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Cyprus. Wolfgang Strasbourg, Eastward Ho, They
Said Warily, THE ECONOMIST, July 19, 1997, at 43 [hereinafter Strasbourg, Eastward Ho].
3. See infra notes 110-29 and accompanying text (discussing the Maastricht convergence criteria).
4. See infra notes 156-70 and accompanying text (analyzing the terms of the Stability and Growth Pact).
5. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, May 25, 1957, Belgium, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, and West Germany, 163 U.N.T.S. 51 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]; see David Currie,
Economist Intelligence Unit, ThePros and Cons of EMU <www.eiu.comllatestlrremu/cr7zzl00-10.html> (visited
Oct. 19, 1997) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (stating that in 1958, the EU was established and
included Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and West Germany). In 1973, Denmark, Ireland and
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on January 1, 1958 and has been amended numerous times to reflect expanding
membership within the EU. 6 In 1973, Denmark, Ireland'and the United Kingdom
were admitted to the EU.7 In 1981, EU membership was expanded to include
Greece, and in 1986, Portugal and Spain were also admitted. Finally, in 1995,
Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the Union, bringing total EU membership to
15 Member States.9
Article 4 of the EEC Treaty mandates that the activities of the Union will be
carried out by a European Parliament, a Council, a Commission and a European
Court of Justice.'
A. The European Parliament
Article 137 of the EEC Treaty mandates the creation of the European Parlia-
ment, which is to consist of representatives of the people of the individual states."
Although Article 138 states that parliamentary representatives are to be elected by
Member States' citizens,12 Article 137 essentially relegates the European Parliament
to an advisory role. 3 Because the European Parliament is the only EU institution
whose members are directly elected by the people, this has raised concerns that the
structure of the EU is not sufficiently democratic.
4
Talk of a "democratic deficit" within the EU is common and is blamed for an
overall loss of support for the EU in general.' 5 In fact, in Austria and Sweden, which
the UKjoined the EU; Greece in 1981; Spain and Portugal in 1986; and Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. Ld.
6. See Currie, supra note 5 (listing the members of the EU).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.; see Europe's Mid.Life Crisis, supra note 1, at 2 (noting EU membership has grown from 6 to 15
Member States).
10. See EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 4; see also Dr. Mark L. Jones, Doing Business in the European
Internal Market: Putting "1992" in Perspective, 9 J. INT'L L. Bus. 463, 468-69 (1992) (remarking that Article 4
of the Treaty states that the tasks of the Community are to be carried out by four institutions-a European
Parliament, a Council, a Commission and a Court of Justice).
11. See EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 137; see also Jones, supra note 10, at 469 (noting that the European
Parliament, originally called the Assembly, consists of representatives directly elected by the citizens of the Member
States). The 518 members of the European Parliament sit according to political grouping rather than nationality.
Id. Despite its name and claim to democratic legitimacy, the Treaty envisages that the Parliament will have an
essentially advisory and supervisory role. Id.
12. EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 138.
13. See EEC Treaty, supra note 5. art. 137 (limiting the European Parliament to exercising the advisory and
supervisory powers conferred upon it by the Treaty).
14. See Europe's Mid-Life Crisis, supra note I, at 15-16 (concluding that the gap between the "bureaucrat
in Brussels" and the man on the street is widening, and suggesting that Europeans would react more favorably to
the EU if only its institutions were more democratic). Although in most EEC countries, the majority still feels that
the EU is a good thing, the margins are steadily falling. Id. Norwegians have twice voted against EEC membership,
and the Swiss have refused to ratify their membership in a free trade club, known as the European Economic Area.
Id. The Danes shocked the Union by narrowly voting against ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, and the French,
original EEC Treaty signatories, approved the Maastricht Treaty by a very thin margin. Id.
15. Id. at 16.
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joined the EU as early as 1995,16 opinion polls show that the majority of voters
would not support EU membership now.' 7 Proposals for making the EU more demo-
cratic often involve strengthening the role of the European Parliament by linking
the appointment of commissioners 8 to Parliamentary elections within the individual
Member States.19
Presently, there are 626 seats in the Parliament, which uses a system of
weighted voting in which smaller countries are heavily overrepresented. 20 For
instance, Germany, with a population of approximately 81 million people,2' holds
99 seats within the European Parliament, 22 or roughly one seat for every 800,000
people. By contrast, Belgium, which has a population of approximately ten million
people,' maintains 25 seats within the Parliament,24 or approximately one seat for
every 400,000 people. Thus, Belgium is disproportionately represented within the
Parliament relative to Germany.
B. The European Commission
Articles 155-163 of the EEC Treaty mandate the creation of a European Com-
mission.' The purpose of the Commission is to ensure the proper functioning of the
common market.26 In general, the Commission formulates proposals for the EU,
enforces EU laws against Member States and individuals, and serves as the EU's
16. See Currie, supra note 5 (showing that Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995).
17. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (noting that opinion polls in Austria and Sweden suggest that
a majority of voters would now vote against EU membership).
18. See infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the European Commission).
19. See Europe's Mid-Life Crisis, supra note 1, at 15-16 (analyzing proposals for making the EU more
palatable to its citizens, one of which involves linking appointment of commissioners to Parliamentary elections).
20. See id. at 12 (listing each Member State's percentage of the EU's population, votes in the Council of
Ministers, Seats in the Parliament and number of Commissioners). The Council of Ministers uses a system of
weighted qualified-majority voting in which small countries are heavily over-represented. Id. They are also over-
represented in the Commission and in the Parliament. Id.
21. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS YEARBOOK, Vol. XLVIII,
at 390-91 (1995) [hereinafter IMF].
22. See Europe's Mid-Life Crisis, supra note 1, at 12 (showing that Germany currently has 99 seats in the
European Parliament).
23. See IMF, supra note 21, at 232-33.
24. See Europe's Mid-Life Crisis, supra note 1, at 12 (listing Belgium as holding 25 seats in the European
Parliament).
25. See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of the European Commission).
26. See EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 155; see also Jones, supra note 10, at 469 (interpreting Article 155
to mean that the Commission's purpose is to ensure proper functioning of the common market). Specifically, the
Commission formulates proposals for Community legislation, enforces Community law against Member States and
individuals, and generally acts as the executive arm of the Community. Id.
The Transnational Lawyer/ VoL 11
executive branch. Article 157 mandates that the Commission include at least one
but not more than two nationals of each Member State.2
Commissioners are appointed for four year terms by Member States' govern-
ments, and according to Article 157, are to be "completely independent in the
performance of their duties. 2 9 Moreover, commissioners are to represent the
interests of the Union and not their home states. Article 157 proclaims that in the
performance of their duties, commissioners may neither seek nor take instructions
from any government or body.
30
C. The European Court of Justice
Articles 164 through 188 of the EEC Treaty mandate the creation of the
European Court of Justice.31 Judges in the European Court of Justice (hereinafter
referred to as the Court) are appointed by Member States' governments for a term
of six years and must be qualified to occupy the highest judicial offices in their
respective countries.32 The Court is to consist of 13 judges who are authorized to
form chambers of three to five judges to undertake "prepatory inquiries" or ad-
judicate cases over which the EEC Treaty has given them jurisdiction.33
The Court has original jurisdiction to determine whether Member States have
failed to comply with their treaty obligations.34 Under Article 169, should the Com-
mission believe that a Member State has failed to fulfill a treaty obligation, it may
bring the matter before the Court.35 Also, under Article 170, one Member State may
bring another Member State before the Court if it feels that state has failed to
comply with its treaty obligations.36 Finally, under Article 177, the Court is given
jurisdiction to issue preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of the EEC
Treaty, the validity and interpretation of the acts of other institutions of the Union
27. See Jones, supra note 10, at 469.
28. See EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 157 (isting the requirements for the Commission). The European
Commission must include at least one national of each of the Member States, but may not include more than two
members having the nationality of the same State. Id. The members shall be completely independent in the




31. See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the European Court of Justice).
32. See EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 167 (establishing the requirements for Judges and Advocates-
Generals in the Court of Justice).
33. See Jones, supra note 10, at 469 (explaining the purpose of the European Court of Justice). The Court
is to consist of thirteen judges who may form chambers of three to fivejudges to hear particular categories of cases.
Id. The Court is assisted by six impartial and independent Advocates-General whose duty is to make reasoned
submissions in cases before the Court. Id.
34. See id. (interpreting Articles 169-171 as giving the European Court of Justice original jurisdiction over
enforcement actions against Member States for failure to fulfill an obligation under the EEC Treaty).
35. EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 169.
36. Id. art. 170.
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and the statutes written by the Council, as long as the statutes provide for such
jurisdiction. 7
D. The European Council
Article 145 of the EEC Treaty establishes the Council and charges it with en-
suring that the objectives of the Treaty are fulfilled. 8 As the Community's principle
law-making body, the Council is to coordinate Member States' economic policies.39
In many cases, however, the Council may only act upon a proposal by the Commis-
sion and only after obtaining the opinion of the European Parliament.
4
Interestingly, European Council meetings are not open to the general public.
4'
In fact, the European Council is presently the western world's only legislative body
that passes its laws in secret.42 Moreover, Council members are appointed by Mem-
ber States' governments,43and thus are not directly accountable to the voters of
those states.
Under Article 7 of the 1986 Single European Act,44 which replaces Article 149
of the EEC Treaty, if the Council acts in cooperation with the Parliament, then it
needs only a qualified majority vote to act instead of the unanimous vote it needed
in the past.45 Recall that the European Parliament is the only European institution
elected by the people.4 For this reason, Article 7 could represent a move towards
a more democratic form of EU government by at least providing an incentive to the
Council to act in cooperation with the opinions provided by Parliament.
37. Id. art. 177.
38. See id art. 145 (stating that to ensure that the objectives set out in the EEC Treaty are attained, the
Council shall ensure coordination of the general economic policies of the Member States).
39. Id; see Jones, supra note 10, at 469 (summarizing the duties of the Council as coordinating the general
economic policies of the Member States and referring to the Council as the principal decision-making institution
in the law-making process).
40. See Jones, supra note 10, at 469 (explaining the limitations on the Council's decision-making power).
41. See Europe's Mid-Life Crisis, supra note 1, at 16 (analyzing suggestions to make the EU more
democratic and criticizing the fact that the council is the only legislative body in the western world that passes laws
in secret by calling it "shameful").
42. Id.
43. See EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 146 (mandating that the Council shall consist of representatives of
the Member States delegated by each Member State's government).
44. See infra notes 99-109 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the Single European Act upon
the EU's attempt to establish a monetary union).
45. See EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 149, 1, f11, 2(a) (stating that if the Council acts on a proposal from
the Commission, unanimity is required for any act constituting an amendment to that proposal). But, if the Council
acts in cooperation with the European Parliament, it needs only a qualified majority. Id.
46. See supra notes 11-24 and accompanying text (discussing the composition and duties of the European
Parliament and noting that Article 138 of the EEC mandates that Parliament members be elected by Member States'
citizens).
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In passing its laws, the Council uses an intricate system of weighted voting, and
like the European Parliament, smaller countries are greatly overrepresented. 47 For
instance, Germany, with a population of approximately 81 million,48gets 10 votes
on the Council,49 or approximately one vote for every 8.1 million people. On the
other hand, Belgium, with only 10 million people,50gets 5 Council votes,51 or
roughly one vote for every 2 million people. Presently, there are 87 total votes in
the Council, with 62 needed for a qualified majority.
52
Although this disparity in voting power was most likely intended to calm
smaller states' fears of being dominated by their larger counterparts, this structure
has begun to cause contention within the EU as it spreads eastward.53 Considering
the likely membership of Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia
and Cyprus as early as 2002,' the number of votes in the Council will inevitably
expand. Accordingly, the larger states-namely Germany, Britain, France, Italy and
Spain, which account for roughly 79%55of the EU's 372 million people56-will be
even more underrepresented relative to their populations than they already are.
Moreover, should the EU continue to grow to include such applicants as Estonia,
Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Cyprus, 57 the larger states could
find themselves overwhelmed in the Council by the smaller ones.58
47. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text (showing the disproportionate representation among
smaller countries within the European Parliament).
48. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (noting Germany's population of 81 million people).
49. See Europe's Mid-Life Crisis, supra note 1, at 12 (showing that Germany has 10 votes in the Council
of Ministers).
50. Id.
51. See id. (listing Belgium as having 10 votes in the Council of Ministers).
52. Id.
53. See Strasbourg, A Budget for Reform, supra note 2, at 44 (recommending that, if the EEC is serious
about enlargement, it should reduce the underweighting, relative to their populations, of the large countries, which
risk being overwhelmed by the small ones); see also Europe's Mid-Life Crisis, supra, note 1, at 12 (stating that the
imbalance in favor of small countries may have been tolerable when there were only 6 members, composed of 3
large and 3 small countries, but not in a union of 25 with only 5 or 6 large members). The question of voting
weights has already caused considerable friction. Id. Britain and Spain threatened to block the most recent round
of enlargement (in 1995, taking Austria, Finland and Sweden) unless the weights were altered. Il
54. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (noting that Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Slovenia, and Cyprus have successfully applied to the EU and could join as early as 2002).
55. See Europe's Mid-Life Crisis, supra, note 1, at 12 (listing the percentages of the EU's population as
Germany, 22%; Britain, 15.7%; France, 15.6%; Italy, 15.4%; Spain, 10.5%; these countries combine to account
for 79.2% of the EU's total population).
56. Id.
57. See Strasbourg, A Budget for Reform, supra note 2, at 43.
58. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (pointing out the potential conflicts between the European
Council's current voting structure and the EU's expanding membership).
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III. EARLY ATTEMPTS AT EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION
Attempts to establish monetary unions within Europe can be found both before
and after the signing of the EEC Treaty.59
A. Monetary Union Before the EEC Treaty
In 1865, France, Switzerland, Belgium, Italy and Greece created the Latin
Monetary Union.60 Eight years later, Sweden, Norway and Denmark formed the
Scandinavian Monetary Union.61 Both Unions collapsed due to unforeseen eco-
nomic and political circumstances.
Within the Latin Monetary Union, gold and silver coins of equal weight, and
thus equal value, were accepted as legal tender throughout the Union. 62 However,
when Italy began to continually incur budget deficits, it weakened the value of its
coins relative to the others'.63 Also, the exchange ratio used for the silver coins
collapsed when new discoveries of silver unexpectedly increased the silver supply."
Finally, individual countries began to print large supplies of paper money to finance
their war efforts during World War 1.65 However, this paper money was not recog-
nized by other members and the Latin Monetary Union soon collapsed.6
Participating countries within the Scandinavian Monetary Union67 minted a
common gold coin, the Scandinavian crown.6 ' Although the crown was to circulate
freely throughout the Union, each country retained the right to mint its own
version.69 During World War I, the economies of Denmark and Norway grew much
faster than Sweden's and, subsequently, so did the supply of money within those
59. See generally EEC Treaty, supra note 5 (documenting that the EEC Treaty was signed on May 25,
1957).
60. Lawrence Ingrassia, Exchequered Past, WALLST. J., Jan. 13, 1996, at 1 (comparing U.S. monetary union
with EMU and noting that past attempts at monetary union which didn't involve political union have failed).
Skeptics of EMU note that the difference between the successful U.S. monetary union and the European plan is that
the U.S. was a single country, whereas the EU consists of 15 separate countries. Id. To buttress their argument that
a comparison between U.S. monetary union and EMU is not a valid one, critics of EMU cite the two most ambitious
attempts at monetary union, the Latin Monetary Union and the Scandinavian Monetary Union. Id. Without political
unity, countries within the monetary union would act in their own interest, thus bringing about the collapse of the
monetary union. Id.
61. See id. (explaining the composition and structure of the Scandinavian Monetary Union).
62. See id. (describing the functions of the Latin Monetary Union).
63. Id.
64. See id. (detailing the reasons behind the collapse of the Latin Monetary Union).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Ingrassia, supra note 60, at 1.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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countries.70 Because of the inflationary increase in Denmark and Norway's money
supply, their crowns soon became worth less than Sweden's.
71
However, within the Union, Danish and Norwegian crowns could still be traded
for the more valuable Swedish crowns on a one-for-one basis. 72 Accordingly, cur-
rency traders took their less-valuable Danish and Norwegian crowns to Sweden in
order to exchange them for the more valuable Swedish coins.73 After returning
home, they used the Swedish coins to buy a greater number of Danish and Nor-
wegian crowns, thus increasing their wealth by merely changing currencies. 74 In
order to end the drain on its money supply, Sweden cut off the currency link,
effectively ending the Union.75
B. Monetary Union After the EEC Treaty.
After the formation of the EU, it soon became apparent that a common measure
of value was needed for conducting business within the Union. 76 Member States
needed a measure of value in order to settle claims, establish the Community's
budget, and express common prices for agricultural goods.7 7 Since the signing of the
EEC Treaty, there have been more than ten different units of account used by the
EU.7 8 This underscores both the perceived importance within the EU of establishing
some type of monetary union and the difficulty in maintaining the necessary ex-
change rate stability in the face of volatile economic and political conditions.
One of the first modem attempts at creating a European monetary union occur-
red in 1950, 79 seven years before signing of the EEC Treaty.80 Under the European
Payment Union, Member States established a unit of account, valued in gold, which
had the same value in gold as the U.S. dollar.8' This unit could be converted into
national currencies based upon fixed exchange rates.8 2 Following President Nixon's
decision to abandon the gold standard, fixed rate systems across the world began
70. See id. at 10 (providing the reasons for the collapse of the Scandinavian Monetary Union).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Ingrassia, supra note 60, at 10.
74. Id,
75. Id.
76. See Susan B. Schulman, A Rapid or Evolutionary Approach: The EEC's Adoption of the ECU as a
Common Currency, 12 J. INT'L L. BUs. 390, 391-92 (1991) (chronicling the evolutionary process which led to the
implementation of the ECU as a unit of account).
77. Id.
78. See id. at 393 (noting that it is difficult for a common currency to survive in volatile economic conditions
and divergent nationalistic goals such as varying inflation and unemployment rates).
79. See id. at 392 (describing the European Payment Union as a predecessor to the ECU).
80. EEC Treaty, supra note 5.
81. See Schulman, supra note 76, at 392 (explaining the functional aspects of the European Payment Union).
82. Id.
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to degenerate as the currency to which they were tied, the U.S. dollar, began to float
against other currencies worldwide.1
3
In 1972, with the decline of fixed rate systems, the EU adopted a program
called the "snake."" The snake allowed Member States' currencies to fluctuate +/-
2.25% against the U.S. dollar and +/- 4.5% among any two currencies within the
Union. 5 This allowed Member States' currencies to float together as long as
individual central banks within the Union took the necessary steps to keep currency
fluctuations within the narrow fluctuation range. 6 The oil crisis of the 1970s put the
snake currencies under tremendous pressure and many participants withdrew from
the program due to a perceived need for greater autonomy in currency manage-
ment.
87
In 1975, the EU created the European Unit of Account (EUA). 8 The EUA was
comprised of specific quantities of the nine Member States' currencies.8 9 When the
European Monetary System (EMS) was established by resolution of the Council on
December 5, 1978, the EUA was renamed the European Currency Unit (ECU).90
The ECU now serves as an integral part of EMS. 9t
Under EMS, the ECU is considered a "basket currency" because it consists of
a fixed amount of Member States' national currencies. 92 Once the amount of each
Member State's component currency is set, it can only be changed by unanimous
consent of the Council of Ministers.93 Thus, each currency now has a central ex-
change rate within the EU measured against the ECU.
83. See id. (stating that fluctuation margins were widened against the U.S. dollar and European currencies
following President Nixon's announcement that the dollar was no longer convertible into gold).
84. See id. (describing the "snake" as the most notable attempt at establishing rate stability since the decline
of the fixed rate systems); see also Currie, supra note 5 (showing that, in 1972, the "snake" exchange-rate
mechanism was set up as the Bretton Woods System broke down).
85. See Currie, supra note 5 (explaining the "snake's" functional aspects).
86. Id
87. See id (noting the failure of the snake in the wake of the 1973-74 oil crisis). Thoughts of monetary
union were set aside as inflation took off in the industrial countries following the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries' decision to raise the price of oil in 1973-74. Id.
88. See Schulman, supra note 76, at 393 (reporting that on April 21, 1975, the EU created the European Unit
of Account). The EUA was made up of specific quantities of the nine Member States' currencies and was based
on the International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Right. Id. The EUA laid the foundation for the ECU. Id.
When the EMS was established by a European Council Resolution on December 5, 1978, the resolution included
a clause that renamed the EUA the European Currency Unit. Id.




93. See id. at 392 (noting the requirements for changing the amount of each Member State's component
currency).
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Under the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), these central exchange rates were
used to create a grid of bilateral exchange rates among Member States' currencies.94
Exchange rates were to be fixed so that they would fluctuate no more than +/-
2.25% against the central ECU rate,95 thus reducing exchange rate volatility within
the EU. The ERM soon became regarded as a proven success in providing exchange
rate stability and many European leaders began to believe that it was time to further
develop the EU's monetary system.'
Interestingly, the original EEC Treaty never spelled out the legal consequences
of resolutions passed by the Council. 97 Thus, there was really no legal obligation for
EU members to participate in EMS, since the resolutions were not considered
legally binding. For this reason, it has been speculated that the success of EMS is
due to the sheer political and economic will of Member States in pursuing greater
exchange rate stability.98
IV. THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT
Although considered successful in its objective of providing exchange rate
stability within the EU, the EMS was not legally recognized until passage of the
Single European Act (SEA), considered the most far-reaching revision of the EEC
Treaty to date. 99 First, the preamble to the SEA specifically mentions the EMS reso-
lution and the 1972 Conference on European Monetary Union.1°° In addition,
subsection II of Section 2 of the SEA amends the EEC Treaty to include Article
102a. 10'
94. See Schulman, supra note 76, at 394 (explaining the functional aspects of the Exchange Rate
Mechanism). The ERM attempts to create convergence among member countries' monetary policies by fixing
member currency exchange rates to fluctuate no more than plus-or-minus 2.25%. Id. While membership in the ERM
is not mandatory, Great Britain's recent assent to the mechanism means that all of the currencies making up the
ECU, except the Portuguese escudo and the Greek drachma, are now part of the ERM. Id. A 6% fluctuation rate
allows additional flexibility for new members of the ERM. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Currie, supra note 5 (noting that, in 1979, the EU launched the European Monetary System which
was widely regarded as successful in providing exchange rate stability).
97. See Schulman, supra note 76, at 395 (claiming that "the legal foundation of the ECU and the EMS has
been more political and economic will than any set of enforceable laws"). The EEC Treaty contains little on the
subject of economic and monetary union. Id. "The European Council formed the EMS in an effort to fill this void
and created EMS by resolution." Id. "Resolutions are not defined in the EEC Treaty, and thus the legal
consequences of resolutions are not spelled out." Id. "As a result, there was no requirement to join the EMS because
a resolution can not obligate member countries to do anything." Id. "Consequently, many think the success of the
EMS is due to the political and economic will of the EU for some type of monetary policy convergence." Id.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 395 (explaining the effect of Article 2 of the Single European Act (SEA)). By amending the
EEC Treaty, the SEA, unlike the EMS Resolutions, is binding on community members. Id. As such, it is considered
the most important modification of powers and processes on European integration since the EEC Treaty itself. Id.
100. See EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 102a(l).
101. Id.
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Article 102a proclaims that the convergence of monetary policy is necessary for
the EU's continued development.1° It then commits members to the objectives of
Article 104,03 one of which is maintaining confidence in Member States' cur-
rencies.1 4 To accomplish this, 102a mandates that members "take account of the
experience acquired in cooperation within the framework of the EMS and in
developing the ECU."1"5 Thus, while stopping short of a formal endorsement of
EMU, the reference to the ECU at least provides formal, legal recognition of the
European Monetary System.
Perhaps more significant is the second part of 102a. This clause states that
Article 236 of the EEC Treaty, which authorizes the Council to call for a conference
of Member States' governments, 6 shall be applied should further developments in
the field of monetary policy necessitate any institutional changes."0 7 This clause is
considered the "enabling clause" of 102a and gives the EU the right, through the
Council, to pursue monetary union.'08 Under the SEA, should these institutional
changes be needed in order to implement EMU, unanimous consent of the Council,
Member States and their central banks is required.'09
V. EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION UNDER MAASTRICHT
The mandate of monetary union within the EU, as well as its timetable and the
requirements for admission, can be found in the Treaty of Maastricht, which went
into effect in 1992.11
102. See id. Article 102a states that in order to ensure the convergence of economic and monetary policies,
which is necessary for the further development of the Community, Member States are to cooperate in accordance
with the objectives of Article 104. Id. In doing so, they are to take account of the experience acquired in cooperation
within the framework of the European Monetary System and in developing the ECU and are to respect existing
powers in this field. Id.
103. Id.
104. See EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 104. Article 4 states that "each Member State must pursue the
economic policy needed to ensure the equilibrium of its overall balance of payments and to maintain confidence
in its currency, while taking care to ensure a high level of employment and stable level of prices." Id.
105. Id. art. 102a(l).
106. See id. art. 236 (mandating that if the Council delivers an opinion in favor of calling a conference of
representatives of the Governments of Member States, the conference shall be convened by the president of the
Council for the purpose of determining by the amendments to be made to the EEC Treaty).
107. Id., art. 102a(2).
108. See Schulman, supra note 76, at 396 (interpreting Article 102a(2) as the "enabling clause," giving the
EU the unambiguous right to establish monetary union).
109. See id. at 397 (noting that under the SEA, the unanimous consent of the European Council member states
and their central banks is required for any institutional changes regarding either EMS or EMU).
110. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty].
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A. The Three Stage Process
Under the Treaty of Maastricht, a three phase timetable was formally endorsed
which will lead to the establishment of a single currency."1  Article 104G)(4) of the
Maastricht Treaty contemplates that phase one should last not less than 6 months
12
and the Commission estimates that phase one would not exceed 12 months. 1 3 The
most probable starting date for phase two is January 1, 1999.14 Thus, phase one
should begin between January 1, 1998 and June 30, 1998.
During phase one, the Council will take the necessary steps to establish the
European Central Bank (ECB) and the instruments necessary for conducting
exchange-rate and monetary policy. t5 Also during this phase, the Council will con-
firm which Member States will be allowed to take part in EMU.'1 6 This decision
will be based upon the degree to which they have successfully met the four con-
vergence criteria." 7
During phase two, the Council will fix the conversion rates of participating
countries."' The ECU will then cease to be merely a basket currency" 9and will
become a currency in its own right, with a conversion ratio of one-to-one with the
former basket currency.120 Crucial to the success of EMU in phase two is the
creation of a "critical mass" of activities within the new currency.
2 1
In order to establish the new currency's credibility within the financial markets
by showing that the EMU process is irreversible, central banks, governments,
banking and financial institutions will have to begin using the new currency to
conduct key activities." These activities include setting monetary and exchange
111. See Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the Practical Arrangements for the Introductiop
of the Single Currency, Jan. 22, 1996, at 54 [hereinafter Economic and Social Committee] (listing three phases:
phase one, launch of economic and monetary union; phase two, effective start of EMU; and phase three, final
changeover to the Single Currency).
112. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 110, art. 1090)(4).
113. See Economic and Social Committee, supra note 111, at 55. According to the Commission, phase one
will last 12 months at the most, whereas Article 109(j)(4) of the Maastricht Treaty provides for a period of not less
than 6 months; if phase two were to start on January 1, 1999, phase one would start sometime between January 1,
1998 and June 30, 1998. Id.
114. See id. at 55 (noting that the most probable starting date for phase two is January 1, 1999).
115. See id. (describing the measures to be taken during phase one).
116. See id. (explaining that the list of participating countries will be confirmed phase one).
117. See infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text (discussing the four convergence criteria ofthe Maastricht
Treaty).
118. See Economic and Social Committee, supra note 11I, at 56 (describing the measures to be taken during
phase two).
119. See id. at 57 (explaining the activities to be undertaken during phase two).
120. See id. (detailing the process by which former national currencies are to be converted to the new
currency during phase two).
121. See id. (describing widespread usage ofthe new currency in the non-retail markets as creating a "critical
mass").
122. See id. (noting that the reasons for creating the critical mass are purely monetary in that it would
reinforce the perceived credibility and irreversibility of the single currency).
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rate policies, inter-bank transactions, capital and exchange transactions, incurring
new government debt, and transactions within the wholesale payment systems.'2
Banking services will be expressed in both the new and national currencies, while
consumers will continue to use their national currencies at the retail level. 2 4
Through this interface of currencies, it is expected that the new currency can be
"created" with minimal disruption of national currency mechanisms."z Phase two
is expected to last no longer than three years.12
Finally, during phase three, all national currencies will be converted into the
single currency. 27 The new currency will then become the sole legal tender within
the EMU zone.'2 Phase three is expected to last only as long as it takes to change
the national banknotes into the single currency and to convert such everyday items
as cash registers, ATM's and vending machines to the new currency. 29
B. The Four Convergence Criteria
The four convergence criteria are found in Article 1090) of the Maastricht
Treaty and are as follows:13°
1. Member States must achieve an inflation rate not more than 1.5%
higher than that of the three countries with the lowest inflation.
2. Interest rates must be no more than 2% higher than the three countries
with the lowest inflation.
3. Government debt must be no more than sixty and the current budget
deficit less than 3% of GDP.
4. Member States must maintain their exchange rates within a narrow
margin for at least two years before monetary union. This margin, known
as the "currency band," was set at 2.25%.'13 This meant that, under the
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), EU currencies were not to fluctuate
123. Id.
124. See Economic and Social Committee, supra note 111, at 58 (explaining how the new currency is to co-
exist with existing national currencies during phase two).
125. See id. (alluding to the reason for the gradual phasing in of the new currency).
126. See id. (noting the time frame of phase two).
127. See id. (detailing the activities to be carried out during phase two).
128. Id.
129. See id. at 59 (explaining the duration of phase three).
130. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 110, art. 1090); see also Dr. Dieter Kugelmann, The Maastricht
Treaty and the Design of a European Federal State, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 335, 340 (1994) (listing the
convergence criteria as follows: 1) the achievement of a high degree of price stability apparent from an inflation
rate not more than 1.5% higher than that of the three countries with the lowest inflation; 2) interest rates no more
than 2% higher than that in the three countries with the lowest inflation; 3) government debt no more than 60% of
GDP and budget deficit less than 3% of GDP; and 4) maintaining of the exchange rate within a narrow margin for
at least two years before the monetary union).
131. See Currie, supra note 5 (listing the key features of EMS including its main feature, the ERM's currency
band of plus or minus 2.25% of the central ECU rate).
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more than 4.5%--plus or minus 2.25%--against the European Currency
Unit.
132
The recent collapse of the ERM has called into question the willingness of
Maastricht Treaty signatories to comply with their obligations at the expense of
national economic objectives.
C. Collapse of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM)
Beginning in September, 1992, the European Monetary System began to
experience a crisis which called into question the very future of the EU.133 The
German government had relied heavily on deficit spending in order to finance its
reunification with the former East Germany. By June of 1992, German domestic
deficit spending exceeded 7% of GDPt35 which, in turn, ignited higher than usual
inflation within Germany's economy.
136
In response to this rising inflation, Germany's central bank, the Bundesbank,
raised its prime lending rate to the highest level since 1981.137 This, in turn,
bolstered the strength of the German deutchmark relative to Germany's EU
partners' currencies. Other EU countries, including France and Great Britain, were
forced to either allow their currencies to devalue against the German mark or raise
interest rates in order to protect their values.
31
At the time, Britain was deeply mired in a recession, and desperately needed an
interest rate cut in order to stimulate growth.139 However, British Prime Minister,
John Major, believed that devaluing the pound against the mark would be seen as
a failure of his administration's pro-European, anti-inflationary economic
132. Id.
133. See Craig R. Whitney, Blaming the Bundesbank, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1993, at 48 (describing the EMS
crisis and the subsequent attempts of the European Monetary Committee to rectify it as a last-ditch attempt at
salvaging the "European Dream").
134. See Christopher Young, The Ramifications of the Exchange Rate Collapse in Europe: Implications for
Monetary Union, 13 B.U. INT'L LJ. 263, 275 (1995) (explaining that Germany incurred substantial government
deficits in financing its reunification).
135. See Whitney, supra note 133, at 48.
136. See Currie, supra note 5 (pointing out that Germany, having to contend with rising inflationary pressures
after unification, was out of sine with Europe's other economies). Other countries, including the UK and France,
were in the middle of recessions and rising unemployment. Id.
137. See Whitney, supra note 133, at 44 (stating that aunited Germany meant not only both large government
outlays and private borrowing, but by the summer of 1992, higher inflation than usual); see also Currie, supra note
5. As the Bundesbank drove up interest rates to contain German inflation, other European central banks were forced
to raise their interest rates to maintain their EMS parities, even though this worsened recessions at home. Id. Foreign
exchange markets asked how long the French, Italian, Spanish and UK governments would be able to sustain these
high interest rates, unpopular with the electorate. Id.
138. Currie, supra note 5.
139. See Whitney, supra note 133, at 44 (noting that Britain, having been in a recession since 1989, needed
lower interest rates).
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policies. 140 Thus, he chose to maintain high interest rates in order protect the British
pound.' 4' France followed suit, and the French Central Bank actually raised its
interest rates from 7.75% to a full 10% overnight,'42 although they too were
struggling with a recession and rising unemployment. t43 This exacerbated both
countries' recessions by making it more expensive to borrow money.' 44 Currency
speculators soon began to wonder how long political pressures would allow Britain
and France to maintain such interest rates.
t4
On September 16, 1992, dubbed "Black Wednesday," the speculators were
given their answer when Britain was compelled to withdraw from the ERM
altogether.'4 Soon after, currency speculators began to sell billions of French francs
for German deutchmarks. 47 Central banks were unable to coordinate a defense to
the run on the franc in order to maintain EMS parity.t48 By July 30, 1993, "Black
Friday," it became obvious that emergency actions were necessary. 49 On August
2, after a weekend-long emergency meeting, the European Monetary Committee
announced that the EMS currency band would be widened from 2.25% to a full
15%.150 It is widely believed that allowing EU currencies to fluctuate against each
other by up to 30%--15% on either side of their ECU rates-left the EMS alive in
name only.'5'
It is ironic that the same feature of the Bundesbank which made the German
mark the "anchor" currency of the EMS, its obsessive commitment to low in-
140. See id. (arguing that the prestige that came from maintaining their own currency against the mark seemed
to matter more to the politicians than whether or not higher interest rates were good for their countries' economics).
141. See id. (discussing political pressures behind John Major's decision to maintain high interest rates in
the middle of a recession).
142. See id. (examining the actions taken by the French Central Bank in order to protect the value of the
franc).
143. See Currie, supra note 5 (pointing out that France, Italy and the UK were struggling with recessions and
rising unemployment rates and that raising interest rates to maintain EMS parities exacerbated their economic
downturn).
144. See Whitney, supra note 133, at 44 (explaining how the high interest rates needed to bring about EMS
parity affected European economies). High interest rates made it more expensive for people and companies to
borrow, which discouraged spending by consumers and investment by the companies that supply them. Id.
145. See Currie, supra note 5 (noting that Britain and France were not similarly situated to Germany, and
thus, could not easily maintain such high interest rates).
146. See Young, supra note 134, at 276 (characterizing September 16, 1992 as "Black Wednesday" and the
first "crack" in the system).
147. See Whitney, supra note 133, at 44 (describing the events behind the run on the franc).
148. See Young, supra note 134, at 277 (describing July 30, 1993 as "Black Friday" and the second crack
in the system); see also Whitney, supra note 133, at 48. By July 29, Germany had realized a $37 billion increase
in its money supply due to the sheer volume of francs and other currencies exchanged for deutchmarks. Id.
149. See Whitney, supra note 133, at 44 (chronicling the events leading up to the emergency meeting of the
European Monetary Committee).
150. Id. at 59.
151. Id.
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flation,152 was also responsible for the collapse of the ERM. In Germany, the horrors
of 1923's monthly hyperinflation of almost 30,000%153 and the resulting economic
collapse, which gave rise to the Nazis and World War II, are still taught to every
schoolchild.1 54 The Bundesbank, by raising interest rates, thus behaved like an
inflation-conscious German Central Bank, and not an independent European Central
Bank like other EU members had wanted.'55
D. The Stability and Growth Pact
Another of the Bundesbank's concerns was that, through monetary union,
fiscally irresponsible states would be encouraged to engage in excessive borrowing
to the detriment of the EU. 56 Presently, should a Member State want to borrow
money, it is limited by the size of its capital market. 57 If the Member State wants
to borrow more than its domestic market can supply, it must borrow in a foreign
currency, which would expose it to exchange-rate risks.58 These risks would pre-
sumably serve as a disincentive to excess government borrowing.
Under EMU, Member States' governments would no longer be limited to their
own domestic capital markets, but rather would have access to the entire EMU
zone.159 Thus, Member States would be able to borrow far more without incurring
-any currency risks. By increasing demand for the new currency, prolifigate bor-
rowers, it was argued, would drive up real interest rates within the EU.' 6W Fellow
Member States, through higher interest rates, would thus end up subsidizing this
excess borrowing. 6 'Even worse, should those prolifigate borrowers become insol-
152. See id. at 44 (noting that with the Bundesbanks doing the best job of any European central bank in
keeping inflation low, the German mark naturally became the anchor of the European Monetary System when it
was set up in 1979).
153. See Currie, supra note 5 (commenting that even during extreme circumstances, such as when the 1922-
23 monthly rate of inflation in Germany reached nearly 30,000%, people continued to use their currency).
154. See Whitney, supra note 133, at 44 (explaining why the Bundesbank is committed to low inflation).
155. See id. at 48 (noting that the British wanted the Bundesbank not only to have the power and prestige of
a European central bank, but also behave like one by relaxing monetary policy because it would benefit other
countries even if that wasn't the right policy for Germany); see also Currie, supra note 5 (pointing out that in order
to preserve a hard EMS the Bundesbank needed to behave more like a central bank of Europe and less like a central
bank of Germany).
156. EMU and What Alice Found There, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 1996, at 24.
157. See id. (explaining the rationale for the Bundesbank's fear of excessive government borrowing).
158. Id.
159. Id:
160. Id.; see also Currie, supra note 5 (arguing that with a single currency governments can borrow partly
at other governments' expense, because their extra demands on the capital market force the interest rate to increase
across Europe, rather than merely increasing their own interest rate).
161. See EMU and What Alice Found There, supra note 156, at 24.
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vent, fellow Member States might feel compelled to provide direct subsidies to keep
them afloat.162
Motivated by this fear, Germany's finance minister, Theo Waigel, proposed the
Stability and Growth Pact at the Dublin Summit in 1996.'63 Although initially
opposed by several participants, the summit members eventually agreed to the
essentials of the German proposal.1t Interestingly, although Article 1090) of the
Maastricht Treaty does not require that Member States adhere to the 3% of GDP
deficit ceiling indefinitely,1 65 under the Pact, fines of 0.2% of GDP are to be levied
upon Member States whose budget deficits exceed 3% of GDP.' An additional
fine of 0.1% of GDP is levied for every additional one percent breach of the ceiling,
with a maximum fine of 0.5% of GDP.'67
In the event of a breach of the three percent ceiling, the European Commission
is to report the discrepancy to the Council of Ministers, which will decide by a
qualified majority whether exceptional circumstances exist which justify the
deficit. 168 Exceptions are to be automatic in the event of a natural disaster or if the
Member State's GDP falls 2% or more within a year.t69 If the Member State's GDP
falls between 0.75% and 2% within one year, the Council has the discretion of
whether or not to levy fines. 70 The Stability and Growth Pact thus provides some
limitations upon individual Member States' Fiscal policies.
VI. LONG-TERM MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF EMU
Despite some clear advantages, the implementation of a single EU currency has
profound ramifications for Maastricht Treaty signatories' ability to control inflation,
manage the economic cycle and borrow money.
162. See Currie, supra note 5 (noting that should a government participating in EMU get into a debt trap there
could be pressure on other member governments to provide subsidies to help service the debt or take over
responsibility for the debt itself).
163. See Currie, supra note 5 (chronicling the development of the Stability and Growth Pact).
164. Id.
165. See EMU and WhatAlice Found There, supra note 156, at 23 (claiming that it was never envisaged that
EMU members would be under a strict obligation to keep their deficits always below 3% of GDP, or that violators
would face semi-automatic fines).
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A. Clear Advantages
One of the most obvious advantages is the expected realization of lower
transaction costs within the EU. With fifteen separate currencies, 172 cross-border
business requires conversion transactions, which cost both time and money.17 1 In
fact, it is estimated that if a European citizen changed 1,000 deutchmarks into each
Member State's currency in succession, he would have only 500 left by the time he
converted back to the deutchmark. 74 By no longer having to convert national cur-
rencies for EU-wide transactions, the EU's economy is expected to realize savings
of between 0.3-0.4% of GDP, or approximately 20-25 billion ECU's. 75
This broad forecast range is due to the uncertainty of the number of countries
that will qualify to participate in EMU.176 Naturally, the greater the number of EU
countries participating in EMU, the less currency conversion will be required, and
thus the greater the savings. Although this amount represents an ongoing savings,
its relatively small size probably does not provide a strong reason for converting to
a single currency.
Perhaps more significant, EMU is expected to completely eliminate exchange
rate volatility within the EU. 177 Historically, exchange rates have been known to
fluctuate erratically due to arbitrary speculation within the currency markets.
78
Eliminating this fluctuation would also eliminate the currency risks associated with
cross-border financial planning and most likely encourage cross-border investment
within the EU. For example: a Mercedes Benz factory in Frankfurt purchases com-
ponent parts from Great Britain. Should the value of the British pound rise against
the German deutchmark, Mercedes would have to pay more for those parts because
it would take more German deutchmarks to purchase the parts valued in British
pounds. Although EMS was supposed to alleviate this type of problem, the failure
of Member States to fulfill their exchange rate obligations under Maastricht and the
subsequent widening of the currency band1 79 shows that EMU would present a clear
advantage in this area.
171. See Economic and Social Committee, supra note 111, at 52 (referring to the benefits of EMU to
individuals and companies as "self-evident").
172. See Europe's Mid-Life Crisis, supra note 1, at 4.
173. See Economic and Social Committee, supra note 111, at 52 (citing the benefits of EMU).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See id. (explaining the reasons for the wide forecast margins ofexpected exchange transactions savings).
177. See Currie, supra note 5 (pointing out that a single EU currency means the elimination of all exchange
rate volatility within the EU).
178. Id.
179. See supra notes 133-55 (discussing the collapse of the Exchange Rate Mechanism).
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B. Controlling Inflation
In 1999, the European Monetary Institute (EMI), consisting of governors from
former national banks, will assume its role as the European Central Bank (ECB).
80
The ECB will then begin exercising authority over European monetary policy,
eventually controlling both interest rates and the money supply.'8! This, of course,
means that individual EU nations will no longer be able to control their money
supply or set their own interest rates. One of the advantages of relinquishing control
of monetary policy to the ECB is that it could ensure long-term, low inflation rates
for the EU as a whole. 8 2 As premiums for high inflation are removed from long-
term interest rates, 83 interest rates throughout the EU would likely fall. This, in
turn, would bolster the EU's competitiveness by making it cheaper to borrow
money for new plants and equipment.
While these advantages may accrue to countries with high inflation, Germany,
which has maintained low inflation rates for decades, would probably not realize
the same benefits.'8 Moreover, Austria, France and the Netherlands have attached
their currencies to the German deutchmark 8 5 In doing so, they have adopted Ger-
many's inflation-conscious Bundesbank as their de-facto central bank, and would
also probably not realize lower inflation.
8 6
Because the ECB is composed of governors of former national banks, one con-
cern is that, as the EU expands eastward, it may lose its commitment to low-
inflation monetary policies. 87 Presently, the EU's newest potential members-
Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Cyprus-maintain per
capita GDP's of only 11%, 14%, 20%, 19%, 42% and 71%, respectively, of the EU
average.88 Thus, it is reasonable to speculate that ECB governors from these new,
poorer members may favor a more liberal monetary policy designed to promote
180. See Kugelmann, supra note 130, at 341 (reporting that, together with the national central banks, the ECB
will form the European System of Central Banks, and have the exclusive right to authorize the issue of banknotes
within the EU); see also Currie, supra note 5 (explaining that National central banks will become branch offices
of the ECB, which will set a common monetary policy across the EMU).
181. See Kugelmann, supra note 130, at 342.
182. See Currie, supra note 5 (noting that an important advantage of EMU is that the ECB could assure
durably low inflation for the EMU area as a whole).
183. See id. (pointing out that low inflation would imply low interest rates, both short-term and long-term,
as premiums for inflation would be eliminated from interest rates).
184. See id. (speculating that the ECB's performance may not be as good as the Bundesbank's and could
scarcely offer more for Germany than the status quo).
185. Id.
186. See id. (noting that Austria, France and the Netherlands probably would not realize lower inflation
through EMU).
187. See id. (noting that there is a concern that, as membership widens, governors of central banks from more
inflation-prone countries could take a less robust line on limiting inflation).
188. See Strasbourg, A Budget for Reform, supra note 2, at 43 (listing per capita GDP as percentage of EU
average for Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Cyprus).
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economic growth, rather than a restrictive monetary policy designed to curb
inflation.
On the other hand, as a new financial institution, the ECB will need to prove its
commitment to low inflation to the financial markets in order to establish its
credibility.189 Should the ECB choose to do this by maintaining high interest rates,
it could exacerbate the EU's already high unemployment.!" In 1997, unemployment
within the EU stood at an average of 10.6%,' 9' compared to the U.S. rate of only
4.9%.192
Specifically, in February of 1997, it was reported that unemployment in Ger-
many had climbed to 4.7 million, or 12% of the workforce.' 93 That same year,
French unemployment stood at 12.6% and, in Spain, it reached a horrific 19.9%.1
94
Interestingly, since 1991, unemployment in Britain has fallen to just 5.3%.195 This
underscores another challenge to the ECB: how to apply a one-size-fits-all monetary
policy to individual nations whose economic cycles do not always coincide.
C. Managing the Economic Cycle
One of the inevitable consequences of relinquishing control of monetary
policies to the ECB will be that individual nations will forfeit their ability to use
monetary policy in order to deal with an economic downturn.19 6 Instead, monetary
policy will be controlled by the average circumstances existing within the EU.197
While this may be appropriate for aggregate European economic downturns (those
which affect all EU members), the effectiveness of such a monetary policy for
asymmetric economic downturns (those that only affect certain economies within
the EU) is questionable. 98
189. See Currie, supra note 5 (speculating that, unlike the Bundesbank, the ECB would have a reputation to
establish and that a period of somewhat higher interest rates may be needed to demonstrate its anti-inflation
resolve).
190. European Employment, Fiddling, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 1997, at 54 (noting that approximately 18
million EU citizens are jobless and that the EU has an average unemployment rate of 10.6%).
191. Id.
192. Growth & Jobs, The Clouds Clear over Europe, THEECONOMIST, Sept. 27, 1997, at 86.
193. Sweatingforthateuro, THEECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 1997, at 45.
194. See European Employment, supra note 190, at 54 (reporting that the latest unemployment rates for
France and Spain were 12.6% and 19.9%, respectively).
195. See Growth & Jobs, The Clouds Clear over Europe, supra note 192, at 86 (stating that, since the early
1990's, unemployment in Britain has fallen from 10.5% to just 5.3%).
196. See Currie, supra note 5 (observing that, inside EMU. monetary policy could not respond to particular
circumstances of a particular national economy and that, instead, monetary policy will be set to reflect average
circumstances across the Union).
197. Id.
198. See id. (explaining that economic cycles within the EU do not always coincide). Evidence on the cycles
across the European economies shows both a common element due to aggregate shocks and national elements due
to so-called asymmetric shocks. Id. An example of an aggregate shock would be a fail in global demand, which
would effect every European exporter in broadly the same way. Id. An example of an asymmetric shock would be
an increase in the price of oil: The UK, as a net oil exporter would gain, while other European countries, who are
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Moreover, the structures of individual EU financial systems vary dra-
matically,'9 and a single ECB policy will most likely affect those individual
economies much differently. For instance, households in the United Kingdom tend
to borrow more heavily and at a variable rate of interest than their German
counterparts who borrow less and whose debt is usually at a fixed interest rate.200
For this reason, an increase in the ECB's interest rate would have a dispropor-
tionately negative impact on demand within the UK.201 Similarly, a cut in interest
rates would have a disproportionately positive impact on UK demand. 202 Thus,
using the ECB's prime lending rate as a tool for slowing or accelerating economic
growth would tend to increase the volatility of the business cycles within the UK
relative to those in Germany.
Deprived of their ability to use monetary policy under EMU, individual
Member States would have to rely more heavily upon fiscal policy to correct an
asymmetrical downturn. 2 3 Recall that the Stability and Growth Pact would impose
significant fines on Member States whose deficits exceed the Maastricht three
percent of GDP ceiling.204 Although intended to prevent irresponsible fiscal policies
among Member States,0 5 this constraint can also serve to limit the ability of
governments to use fiscal policies to correct economic downturns.
206
For instance, during an asymmetric downturn, a Member State would inevitably
experience a decline in tax revenues as higher unemployment rates would translate
into fewer people paying taxes. Also, the Member State would be obligated to pay
more money in unemployment benefits for those who lost theirjobs. Intuitively, this
combination would mean the government would have more financial obligations
and less money with which to meet them.
If the Member State were operating at a deficit below the three percent ceiling
during the downturn, its government would have to either raise taxes or cut
spending in order to prevent its deficit from exceeding the ceiling.207 Either way, it
net importers of oil, would lose. Id.
199. See id. (explaining the difference between EU financial systems by pointing out the differences in both




203. See EMU and What Alice Found There, supra note 156, at 24 (noting that it seemed dangerous to tie
governments' hands through the Stability and Growth Pact when fiscal policy would have to carry more of the
burden of cushioning recessions).
204. See Currie, supra note 5 (explaining the terms of the Stability and Growth Pact).
205. See supra notes 156-70 and accompanying text (noting the concerns of the Bundesbank which led to
the establishment of the Stability and Growth Pact).
206. See infra notes 207-I1 and accompanying text (explaining the constraints that the Stability and Growth
Pact place upon Member States' ability to use fiscal policies in order to correct economic downturns).
207. See EMU and What Alice Found There, supra note 156, at 23 (noting that fiscal adjustments would be
needed during a recession in order to prevent the Member State's deficit from exceeding the 3% of GDP ceiling).
Recent history has shown that the scale of these adjustments would be quite large. Id. For instance, when Britain
went from an economic boom into a recession in the late 1980's, the public sector balance deteriorated from a
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would work to deepen the economic downturn."8 This would result in even less tax
revenue and more unemployment obligations which would, in turn, make it even
more difficult for the government to keep its deficit under the ceiling.
The Maastricht Treaty generally contemplates that powers over fiscal policy
will remain at the national level.' Member States' powers to levy taxes on their
citizens thus remain discretionary.2"' Should a Member State be required to pay the
Stability and Growth Pact fine, which could be as high as 0.5% of GDP,21' the EU
would be powerless to require that state to raise sufficient taxes to finance its pay-
ment. Also, it is doubtful, for obvious political reasons, that any Member State
would fail to meet its domestic financial obligations during a recession. Therefore,
paradoxically, requiring payment of the fine, without the ability to require the
Member State to raise sufficient taxes to finance its payment, could actually
encourage deficit spending. For this reason, the ability of the Stability and Growth
Pact to limit government borrowing during a recession seems at best tenuous.
D. Impact on Government Borrowing
One of the most significant aspects of EMU will likely be the impact that it has
on government borrowing by Member States.21 2 As discussed earlier, Bundesbank
officials fear that EMU will make it easier for profligate governments to engage in
excessive borrowing to the detriment of the Union.2 3 In essence, concern may be
warranted when governments are maintaining either a high but sustainable debt or
a debt which is wholly unsustainable.2 t4
If the Member State's debt is sustainable, meaning that the government is able
to service the debt indefinitely, 215 the concern is that the increased demand in the
surplus of 3% to a deficit of 7%. Id.
208. See icL (explaining that the Stability and Growth Pact would require Member States to maintain budget
surpluses during "normal" times in order to leave room for government borrowing during recessions). Without such
surpluses, the Stability and Growth Pact would end up being more of a "deepen-your-recession" pact Id.
209. See Currie, supra note 5 (noting that, in principal, monetary union does not necessarily place constraints
on independent national fiscal policy and that governments remain free to borrow as they choose).
210. See id. (pointing out that a positive aspect of EMU is that governments will lose the capacity to use or
abuse monetary policy, but will otherwise retain powers over tax and spending decisions).
211. See Currie, supra note 5 (explaining that the maximum fine imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact
is 0.5% of Gross Domestic Product).
212. See infra notes 213-36 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of EMU upon Member States'
ability to borrow).
213. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text (detailing the motivation behind proposal of the Stability
and Growth Pact).
214. See Currie, supra note 5 (separating potential government debt problems within the EMU into two
distinct types: unsustainable debt and high, but sustainable debt).
215. See id. (defining high, but sustainable debts).
1998/Beyond Maastricht
capital markets could push up interest rates throughout the EMU zone. 21 6 Govern-
ments, it was argued, would be encouraged to borrow more since the cost of their
excess borrowing, the increase in interest rates, would no longer be carried by them
alone, but rather by all their fellow EMU members.217
An unsustainable debt would result when a government continually engages in
excessive borrowing such that continuing the practice would lead to that govern-
ment's insolvency.218 The concern here was that, should a Member State become
unable to service its debt, other Member States could come under pressure to pro-
vide subsidies to that state.219 It was these concerns which lead to the Stability and
Growth Pact and the Maastricht fiscal convergence criteria.22° Informal constraints
on excessive government borrowing can be found in the ECB's role in the open
market.
22'
Under Article 107 of the Maastricht Treaty, the ECB is to operate indepen-
dently of both the EU and Member States' governments.222 This means that it will
be able to choose which national debts it wishes to finance.2' Theoretically, it could
choose to hold the debts of those countries with sound fiscal policies and sell the
debts of those with imprudent policies. 224 As such, it could provide an incentive to
Member States to adopt responsible fiscal measures.
Moreover, within EMU, different Member States' governments will be required
to pay different rates of interest on their debts based on their credit ratings.22 States
216. See id (noting the concerns surrounding Member States' maintenance of high, but sustainable debts).
If the debt is merely high, rather than unsustainable, there should be no need to provide subsidies to the Member
State maintaining it. Id Instead, the concern is that if some governments are able to borrow too heavily, it will push
up the general cost of borrowing throughout the EMU zone to the detriment of all. lit
217. See id. (explaining the argument that with a single currency, governments can borrow partly at other
governments' expense, because their extra demands on the capital market would force up interest rates throughout
the EU). This theory has been called "financial externality." Id.
218. See id. (defining unsustainable debts). An example of an unsustainable debt is that held by Greece. Id.
Debt levels in that country have risen steadily over the past 15 years such that deficit spending will eventually have
to come to a radical end. Id.
219. See id. (explaining the concerns surrounding unsustainable debts).
220. See Currie, supra note 5 (claiming that these concerns led to formulation of the Maastricht fiscal
convergence criteria).
221. See infra notes 223-25 and accompanying text (discussing the ECB's role in the open market).
222. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 110, art. 107 (establishing the independence of the ECB). "When
exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by this Treaty and the Statute of
the ESCB, neither the ECB, nor a national central bank, nor any member of their decision-making bodies shall seek
or take instructions from Community institutions or bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any
other body." Id
223. See Currie, supra note 5 (explaining that ECB will face a choice as to which national debt it should buy
or sell and suggesting that the most prudent policy would be holding only the debt of countries with "conservative"
fiscal policies). The ECB could also opt for the mechanical rule of buying and selling the debt of the national
governments in fixed proportions, based upon their economies' relative size within the EU. Id.
224. Id
225. See id. (noting that, under EMU, different governments would be required to pay different rates of
interest on their debt, depending on their credit rating). On top of the risk-free rate, high-debt governments are likely
to face a risk premium reflecting the greater risk of holding their debt. Id. If that government is maintaining a fiscal
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with higher relative levels of debt would naturally represent a greater credit risk.
These states would thus be forced to pay a higher rate of interest, reflecting the
greater risk involved in holding their debt.227
This risk premium would not, however, apply to private debt held by private
companies operating within that state.228 Private companies within that state would
instead have their own credit rating independent of their government's. 2 9 Thus,
under EMU, it would be possible for a private company to actually be a safer credit
risk than it's government.230
Historically, many European countries have .chosen to finance their debt
burdens by inflating their economies.2 t By issuing additional cash during times of
rising prices, a government can reduce the relative size of its debt payments by
inflating the amount it receives in revenues2 32 This so-called revenue, called
"seigniorage," was later renamed the "inflation tax" and has been criticized as a
form of taxation without representation.
However, under EMU, the ECB and not national banks will be responsible for
controlling inflation throughout the EU.z 4 Member States will thus not be able to
intentionally inflate their economies. Instead, they will be forced to finance their
government borrowing through explicit taxes and not the hidden inflation tax.235
This should, in turn, encourage sound domestic fiscal policies and public finance
23
6
policy that allows debt to spiral upward, it would again be punished with higher risk premiums. Id. Currently, this
process operates in the U.S., where different state governments pay different interest rates on their debt depending
upon their creditworthiness. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See id. (pointing out that, with a single currency, it would be easier for credit-worthy private borrowers
to be distinguished from their profligate governments). Under EMU, private borrowers would no longer be "tarred"
by their national currency. Id. Consequently, they could be given a higher credit rating than their government,
which is currently not possible. Id.
229. Currie, supra note 5.
230. Id.
231. See id. (stating that, in periods ofrising prices, when more money is needed to transact business, issuing
additional cash brings appreciable revenues to the state). These additional revenues were historically called
"seigniorage." Id.
232. Id. (explaining the functional aspects ofseigniorage through historical example). Seigniorage has been
the most important source of revenue during times of war as inflationary finance has been used during wartime to
meet the unexpected spending on the military. Id. For instance, during the American Civil War, the Southern States'
taxing ability was weak. Id. Thus, they simply decided to print the money they needed to finance the war effort.
Id. Logically, inflation increased several hundred percent until Northern troops captured the Southern printing press.
Id.
233. Id. (noting that Milton Friedman, founder of modern monetarism, argued against this form of "taxation
without representation").
234. See supra notes 180-95 and accompanying text (discussing the ECB's role in controlling inflation).
235. See Currie, supra note 5 (concluding that under EMU, governments will no longerbe able to reduce their
debt burdens by letting inflation rise). In the end, governments will have to finance their borrowing through explicit




As the deadline for European Monetary Union draws near, many questions re-
main concerning EMU's macroeconomic implications. The ability of the ECB to
effectively handle inflation remains to be seen." 7 Moreover, application of a single
ECB monetary policy to individual economies, whose business cycles do not
always coincide, calls into question the ability of the European Central Bank to set
effective monetary policy for all EU members.238 Finally, it is uncertain whether the
Stability and Growth Pact fines will be sufficient to deter profligate borrowing by
individual Member States, who will ultimately remain in control of their own fiscal
policies. 9
Historically, imposition of a foreign currency upon a nation has been used to
suppress it's sovereignty.24 ° For instance, during the American Civil War, the cir-
culation of the Northern currency within the Southern Confederation served as an
important symbol of the supremacy of the North.24 Today, use of a foreign currency
for domestic transactions, such as use of the U.S. dollar within Russia or Mexico,
is widely seen as a sign of economic weakness.242 For these reasons, it is not
difficult to see how surrendering one's currency, long an important symbol of
national sovereignty,243 can reawaken dormant nationalistic tendencies. Thus, it is
not surprising that many EU citizens simply do not favor monetary union.2"
For them, EMU most likely represents an undesirable and completely
irrevocable step towards the creation of a federal Europe, in which their nation is
subordinate to the federation.245 The Treaty of Maastricht contains no provisions
allowing Member States to reclaim former national powers surrendered to the
237. See supra notes 180-95 and accompanying text (discussing the ECB's role in controlling inflation).
238. See supra notes 196-211 and accompanying text (analyzing the impact of EMU on Member States'
ability to manage the economic cycle).
239. See supra notes 212-36 and accompanying text (summarizing the impact of EMU on government
borrowing).
240. See Currie, supra note 5 (noting that imposition of a currency upon a country has often been an
important part of suppressing its nationhood). One of the earliest acts of the new countries that evolved from the
collapse of the Soviet Union was the design of their own currencies. Id. Likewise, resolution of the American Civil
War was coupled with the imposition of the Northern currency upon the Confederacy. Id. This was a powerful
symbol of the supremacy of the North. Id.
241. Id.
242. See id. (pointing out that, during precarious economic times, a strong foreign currency will often
circulate alongside the national currency).
243. See id. (noting that, over the centuries, nations' currencies bore the heads of their kings, queens or
presidents and, as such, became one of the most potent symbols of their nationhood).
244. See Europe's Mid-Life Crisis, supra note 1, at 16 (claiming that disillusionment within the EU is
reflected in opinion polls and referendums, and graphically illustrating by country the net percentage of those in
favor of a single currency).
245. See Currie, supra note 5 (identifying the argument that, if monetary and political union are the same,
then EMU must bring a federal Europe in which nation states are subordinate).
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European Institutions.246 Theoretically, Member States could violate their Treaty
obligations and withdraw from EMU once implemented. However, depending on
the degree of their integration with the Union, the political, economic and social
costs of withdrawal could prove to be an insurmountable obstacle.247 In sum, under
EMU, Maastrict Treaty signatories will trade some measure of sovereignty for the
possibility of greater economic integration with the European Union. Whether this
trade will be a good one remains to be seen.
246. See id. (noting that international treaties such as the EEC Treaty and the Maastricht Treaty generally
do not allow for the reacquisition of powers surrendered to European institutions, while acknowledging that little
could be done should a member choose to withdraw from the Treaty).
247. See id. (claiming that what would keep European countries in the Union would be a cost/benefit analysis.
involving the political, economic and social costs of withdrawal). Withdrawal would logically be more costly for
each Member State the greater their degree of integration within the EMU. Id.

